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Recent Developments

United States v. Knights:
Warrantless Search of a Defendant, Authorized by a Condition of Probation and
Supported by Reasonable Suspicion, Satisfied Fourth Amendment Requirements
By Kristen Hitchner
he United States Supreme
Court held that a search
pursuant to a probation condition and
supported by reasonable suspicion,
satisfied requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. United States v.
Knights, 534 U.S. 112,151 L. Ed.
2d 497 (2001). In so holding, the
Court determined that one's status as
a probationer diminishes the
reasonable expectation of privacy
enjoyed by other citizens. Id.
Mark James Knights (''Knights'')
was sentenced by a California court
to probation for a drug offense. The
probation order specified that Knights
submit to a "search at anytime, with
or without a search or arrest warrant
or reasonable cause, by any probation
or law enforcement officer." The
probation order, which Knights
signed, stated immediately above his
signature that "1 have received a copy,
read and understand the above tern1S
and conditions ofprobation and agree
to abide by same."
Soon after Knights was placed
on probation, a local power
transformer and telecommunications
vault were pried open and set on fire.
Police suspicion for these and thirty
prior acts of vandalism suggested
involvement by Knights and his friend,
Steven Simoneau. The incidents
began soon after the power company
filed a theft-of-services complaint
against Knights and discontinued his

T

electrical service for non-payment. A
local sheriff's detective, Todd
Hancock ("Hancock"), noticed that
the vandalism coincided with Knight's
court appearances concerning the
theft. Based upon these observations,
Hancock decided to search Knights'
apartment. Hancock did not obtain a
warrant for the search because he
''was aware of the search condition in
Knight's probation order and, thus,
believed that a warrant was not
necessary." Subsequentto the search,
Knights was arrested.
A federal grand jury indicted
Knights for conspiracy to commit
arson, possession of an unregistered
destructive device, and being a felon
in possession of ammunition. Knights
moved to suppress the evidence
discovered as a result of the search.
The district court granted Knights'
motion. The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed, relying on its
earlier decision holding that a search
condition in a probation order "must
be seen as limited to probation
searches, and must stop short of
investigation searches." The Supreme
Court of the United States granted
certiorari.
The Court rejected the reasoning
relied upon by the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, noting that the
California Supreme Court upheld
searches "whether the purpose of the
search is to monitor the probationer

or to serve some other law
enforcement purpose." Id. (quoting
People v. Woods, 21 Cal. 4th 668,
681,981 P. 2d 1019,1027 (1999)).
The Court observed that nothing in
the condition of probation suggested
that searches be confined to those for
probationary purposes only. [d. The
search condition provided that
Knights would submitto a search "by
any probation officer or law
enforcement officer," with no mention
of purpose. Id. Based on its review
of the probation order, the Court
limited its analysis to whether the
Fourth Amendment limits searches
pursuant to a probation condition to
those with a "probationary" purpose.
[d.
Knights contended that a
warrantless search of a probationer
satisfies the Fourth Amendment only
if it is exactly like the search at issue
in GrifJin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S.
868, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709, 107 S. Ct.
3164 (1987). [d. at 590. In Griffin,
the Court upheld the search of a
probationer conducted pursuant to a
regulation pern1itting a warrantless
search of a probationer's home, on
the conditions that there be
'reasonable ground' to believe that
contraband is present and that the
probation officer's supervisor has
given approval for the search. Id.
(quoting GrifJin v. Wisconsin, 483
U.S. 868, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709,107 S.
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Ct. 3164 (1987)). The regulation, at
issue in Griffin, "was not an express
part of Griffin's probation." Id. The
Court held that a "state's operation
of its probation system presented a
'special need' for the 'exercise of
supervision to assure that probation
restrictions are in fact observed.'" Id.
The special need justified Wisconsin's
regulation and, therefore, the search
pursuant to it was reasonable. Id.
Additionally, the Court held that
"probation diminishes a probationer's
reasonable expectation of privacyso that a probation officer may,
consistent with the Fourth
Amendment, search a probationer's
home without a warrant and with only
'reasonable grounds' (not probable
cause) to believe that contraband is
present." Id. at 591. The Court went
further to state that, by upholding the
constitutionality of the search in
Griffin, it was not implicitly holding
that any search not like it is
unconstitutional. Id. Because the
Court found that the search of
Knights' home was reasonable under
a totality ofthe circumstances analysis,
it was unnecessary to address whether
Knights' acceptance of the search
condition constituted consent in the
sense of a waiver of his Fourth
Amendment rights. Id. at 591.
The Court, in analyzing the
Fourth Amendment, expressed that
reasonableness is the "touchstone of
the Fourth Amendment" and "is
determined by 'assessing, on one
hand, the degree to which it intrudes
upon an individual's privacy and, on
the other, the degree to which it is
needed for the promotion oflegitimate
governmental interests. '" Id. (quoting

32.2 U. Bait L.F. 28

Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S.
295, 300 (1999)). Knights, as a
probationer, was touched by both
sides of the balancing test for
reasonableness. Id. Because
probation is a criminal sanction
imposed by the court upon an
offender, it is inherent that
probationers will not, and do not,
enjoy the absolute liberties to which
other citizens are entitled. Id. The
Court explained that any court
granting probation may impose
reasonable conditions that deprive an
offender of some freedoms enjoyed
by law-abiding citizens. /d. "The
probation order clearly expressed the
search condition and Knights was
unambiguously informed of it. " Id. at
592. Therefore, the condition
significantly diminished Knight's
reasonable expectation of privacy. Id.
In assessing the government's
interests, the Court observed that
there are two concerns: rehabilitation
and preventing recidivism. Id. Ifthe
Court ofAppeals for the Ninth Circuit
was correct in its holding, the
government would be forced to focus
only on the first concern while ignoring
the latter concern. Id. The Court's
holding, however, justifies the
government's focus on probationers
in ways not constitutionally pennitted
for the ordinary citizen. Id.
Finally, the Court held that
although the Fourth Amendment
ordinarily requires probable cause, the
balancing of the competing
considerations requires no more than
reasonable suspicion to conduct a
search of a probationer's house. Id.
A lesser degree of probability satisfies
the Constitution when balancing the

interests of the government against
those of private citizens. Id. The
Court held that the same
circumstances that led it to find that
"reasonable
SUspICIon
is
constitutionally sufficient [for a search]
also render a warrant requirement
unnecessary." Id.
The holding in United States v.
Knights is a reflection of the "tough
on crime" attitude now prevalent in the
United States. The holding allows law
enforcement to target convicted
criminals on probation without
observing the same procedural
safeguards, as they would have to with
other citizens. In the instant case, the
Court affirms the erosion of the
expectation of privacy for certain
classes of people, specifically
probationers, because the government's interests in protecting citizens
and reducing crime outweigh those of
probationers.

